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Professor Le:  On  behalf of the  audience  I would  like  to  thank  you
for  that  presentation.  I  would  like  to  make just  two  comments;
they  will  be  very short, and  I believe  there  are  a lot of questions,
so  I will  leave  the  floor to you.
Now,  my  first  remark  pertains  to  the  distinction  you  make
between  so-called  core  rights,  or  individual  rights,  which  you  de-
fine  as  negative  rights-rights  not to  be  tortured  and  so forth-as
individual  rights,  and  rights  of groups.  It  seems  to  me  that  if a
philosopher  has defined  man  as  a social  animal,  I do  not see  how
we  can  take  the  individual out of the  context of the  group.  Maybe
that distinction  between  core rights, as pertaining  to  the  individual
per  se,  and group  rights  is  not  truly  a  distinction  in  view  of the
context  in which  the  International  Covenant on  Civil  and  Political
Rights  arose.
It  seems  that  the  emphasis  should  not  s6  much  be  on  the
individual  as  it should be  on  the  question  of discrimination  based
on  race,  religion,  and  so  forth.  I  would  look  at  the  Covenant  in
that context  and spirit. That  is  my first  remark.
The  second  remark  is  that  I  do  not really  see  the  contradic-
tion  between  the  rights  of  individuals  and  rights  of groups,  as
opposed  to  the human  rights  of all  humankind,  if the purpose  is
to  advance  certain  types  of values  and  rights.  Before  you  can  be
recognized  as  a group,  it  seems  that  the  question  of participation
becomes  a moot question.  That is  my second  remark.
Professor  Steiner. Let  me  say  that I  do  believe  the  Covenant contem-
plates  significant social  or group  activities.  I  think  that one  of the
great  fears  has  been  that people are  swallowed  up  by  their group
identities,  and  lose  their  individual  identity.  The  individual  be-
comes  the  object of the  community  rather  than  being  the  subject
of a  human  right.  We  see  these  tensions  in  the world  today  be-
tween  duties  and  rights,  between  communities  and  individuals,NOTRE  DAME  LAW REVIEW
within  different  religions  and  cultures.  Nonetheless,  I  think  we
need  to  recognize  that  we  humans  must  have  intercourse  with
others,  in  every  sense of the word,  to  survive  as human  beings and
to  grow.  We  need  political  exchange,  we  need  cultural  exchange,
we  need  all  sorts  of  links  to  and  associations  with  other  people.
Assuming  these  are  all  permitted,  group  identities  will  remain
strong,  but  I  would  not  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  individual
must be  swallowed  up  in  the  communal  identity.  Ultimately,  there
is  the sense  that the individual  is  supreme. I  think these covenants
reflect  their western  origin  in  expressing  this  ultimate judgment.
I  think  we  must  keep  the  sense  of adventure  and promise  in
life.  We  must  guard  against  the  world's  becoming  divided  into
constituencies  that just  want  to  protect  themselves  against  inter-
change  and  growth-that  want  to  go  back  in  history  rather  than
forward,  or  to  hold  it just  where  they  are.  I  do  not  think  any
great culture  to  this  day  has prospered  in  that way.  I  do not think
humanity  has  prospered  as  a whole  in  that way.  So  the  question  is
how  individuals  participate  in  social  life.  It  may  well  be  that  cer-
tain  kinds of group  claims are  very  plausible.
Participant.  Two of the  cultures  that  I  have  done field  work in  are
India  and,  last  year,  South  Africa;  these  are  cultures  that  have
developed  two  of  the  most  stratified  systems  of  group  rights,  or
the group  concept of rights. Perhaps  some  of the  dangers  you are
pointing out are indeed  apparent there. I just wanted to make  two
observations.  One  is  that the  very word  "individual"  is itself one of
the  ways  we  think  about  what  a  person  is.  That  is,  the  word  "in-
dividual" seems to  carry with  it a kind  of concept of a  unity that is
not  separable,  which,  in  fact,  has  rights  without  reference  to
groups  and  so  forth.  And  one  of the  leading  anthropologists  in
Indian  culture  points  out  that in  India,  for  example,  the  concept
of the  person  is  really  more  and  is  better  expressed  as  the  con-
cept of the  individual.
I  would  suggest  that  perhaps  this  very  concept,  this  idea  that
you  can  look  both  ways  at  people,  both  as  social  beings  and  also
as  entities  who  carry  their  own  rights  without  reference  to  their
groups,  is  one  of those  sorts  of fundamental  facts  with  which  we
will  constantly  have  to  live.  There  may be  no real  way  to  avoid the
problem  because  of the  cultural  nature  of human  beings.
I  was  struck  by  the  fact  that  in  these  two  cultures,  India and
South  Africa,  it  is  precisely  group  rights  that  are  the  problem.  In
fact,  this  concept  of  group  rights  has  been  specifically  rejected
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because  of the  fact  that  this  course  has  been  used  by  whites  to
suggest,  in  the future of South  Africa,  that their  rights  as  a group
need  to be  protected.  And  civilly,  reverse  discrimination  in  India,
as you  know,  also  causes so  many problems  that it will  probably be
a continuing  theme.
Professor  Steiner. I have  no doubt that some  of my beliefs  have been
influenced  by  my Western  origin.  I simply  could  not be  giving the
same  talk if I  had been  born  a Muslim  in,  say,  India.  Communal-
ism  is  not  my  cultural  experience  in  this  country,  but  I  do  not
believe  that what  I  suggested  is  inconsistent with  their being  pow-
erful  but voluntary  communities.  Who  knows  what  voluntary  is?  I
am  born  what  I  am,  and  never  was  given  choice.  To  extract  or
isolate  myself from  my  heritage-for  example,  to move  out of the
Hindu  community  in  India-may  be  legally  permitted,  but  may
not  be  sociologically  possible  in  terms  of  one's  own  life.  For  a
Turk  to  cross  the  line  in  Cyprus  and  marry  a  Greek  may  be  not
just ill  advised,  but fatal  in  a given  situation  of ethnic  hostility. So
the  notion  of what  is  voluntary  and what  is  coerced, of belonging
to  a community  by choice  or  necessity,  is a very complex  one.
Participant: I  would  like  to  point  to  a  specific  problem  in  this
country  between  group  rights  and  the  rights  of a  specific  ethnic
group  to  exercise  its  own  culture.  The  whole  development  of
women's  rights,  the  right  of  a  woman  not  to  be  discriminated
against, causes  a  dilemma  when  there  is  a  claim  of a  specific  eth-
nic  entity  to exercise  its own  ethnic  identity.  In  a  patriarchal  soci-
ety,  there  is a very strong conflict  between  these claims.
I  also  want  to  point out that  the  right  to  be  the  same  is  the
same  as  having  economic  and  political  equality.  The  right  to  be
different  is  a  right you  can  only  exercise  with  other  people  with
the  same  right.  For  example,  language:  if you  speak  a  language,
you  can  only exercise  that right with  other people who  also  speak
that  language.  It  is  not  a  question  of  rejecting  group  rights  as
such,  but  it  is  a  question  of  speaking  of  rights  in  an  individual
sense,  as  an  individual  entitlement,  and  then  protecting  that spe-
cific  right so  that you  can  exercise  it within  a group.
Professor  Steinen  You  can  see  a lot of these  rights as  either individu-
al  or  collective,  and  the  notion  of gender  discrimination  is  a very
good example.
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Should  a  group's  self-determination,  in  some  fashion,  trump
other  notions  that  are  considered  fundamental  in  the  West?  For
example,  the  argument  can  be  made  that  insistence  on  gender
equality  is inconsistent with  the  freedom  of religion  that is  assured
by  the  Covenant.  You  can  see  how  these  conflicts  come  up within
the  very  core  of the  Covenant.  A  man  could  argue  that it  is  not
that  he wants  a  lot of control  over  women,  but  that  he  is  simply
repeating  what  he  has  been  taught  by  his  religion.  If he  is  a  be-
liever,  an  outside  analyst  may  find  all  kinds  of  ideological,  and
economic, and  political  explanations of his belief, but he  may  also
be manifesting  elements of profound  and deep belief. All  religions
have  beliefs which  are  so  fundamental.
So  what is  deprivation  of human  rights?  Do  you  view  depriva-
tion  from  a  perspective  outside  the  culture  or  from  within  the
culture?  For  example,  are  women  within  Islamic  culture  free  to
choose  in  a Western  human  rights  sense  until  they become  aware
of the possibilities  of change  of their  status?  Are  they  free  if they
then  prefer  to  remain  in  their  status  within  traditional  Islam?  Is
the  infusion  of Western  norms itself  a horrendous  assault  on  the
structure  of Islam?
Terrible  contradictions  arise  when  systems  are simply  in  irrec-
oncilable  conflict  given  the  premises  of  the  universality  of  the
human  rights  movement.
Participant: I  think  it is just  an  argument  for  equal  protection,  or
is  our Constitution just  as  color blind?  You  said  that it  is  danger-
ous  to  create  a  group  autonomy  right because  it  perpetuates  the
barbed  wire  between  groups. You  said  that  this  might be  good be-
cause  putting the barbed  wire  in  will  stop  bloodshed,  or  the  con-
flict between  the  groups. Will  it ever  be  possible  to  get rid  of the
barbed  wire,  or are  you  perpetuating  the  split  more  by  leaving  it
in?
Professor Steiner  Well,  that's  certainly  one  of  the  fears  that  I  ex-
pressed  in  my  talk,  which  relates  to  what  was  discussed  in  Profes-
sor  Chen's  talk.  If  you  treat  the  state  as  necessarily  the  highest
good,  which  not very  many  people  do,  and  if you  say  the  state  is
the  supreme  realizer  of human  values,  then  break-downs  of  that
state  constitute  something  very  serious.  The  state  is  sometimes  a
defender  of human  values,  but  it is  often  oppressive  and  insistent
upon  exerting  its own  power,  or  the  power  of whoever  is  in  con-
trol  of  the  state.  In  those  circumstances,  this  separation  of the
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oppressed  ethnic  minority  may  be  the  only  answer,  and  it  is  not
simply  bloodshed  that may justify it.  I'll use bloodshed  metaphori-
cally.  A  minority  may  be  systematically  trampled  upon,  its  culture
denigrated.  There  are  minorities  in  America  that  fit  that  de-
scription  absolutely,  even  post-slavery.  So  maybe  during  different
stages  in  history the  minority will  feel, even  shy of bloodshed,  that
it is  at the  bottom  of the  heap  in  its  state and  that it will  remain
there  forever  unless  it  is  given  the  right  to  participate  in  some
meaningful  way  in  shaping  its  own  destiny,  as  through  autonomy
schemes.
That,  to  me,  is  a  powerful  claim.  But, I  take  it  as  a  reaction
to  the denial  of the  ideal  in  the  larger  society  of opening up,  in a
genuine  way,  opportunity  and  possibility  of growth  to  all.  There-
fore,  it is  the  second  best.  If the  people  in  charge  are  not going
to  permit  these  other  groups  to  rise,  as  those  people  themselves
must  have  risen,  the  alternative  may  become  bloodshed,  fragmen-
tation,  or  simply  systemic,  ongoing  oppression.  That  is  why  I
would  never  state  that  group  autonomy  rights  are  necessarily  a
denial  of human  rights.
Participant:  If  lawyers  and  universities  looked  at  the  International
Covenant  of  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and  tried  to  find  these
group  rights  in  the  three  articles  you  mentioned,  they  would  dis-
cover  that  the  individual  rights,  to  some  extent,  also  cover  some
group  rights.  It  was  very  important  that  you  mentioned  the  fact
that a  declaration  on  minority  rights  is  now  also  under discussion
in the  United Nations.  But while  the distinction  between  these two
types  of rights,  group  rights  and  individual  rights,  is  perhaps  a
little  less  problematic  for analytical jurisprudence,  it is of particu-
lar importance  for practical  policy making and  practical politicians.
I  think  this  contradiction  cannot  be  understood  and  explained
unless  we  add  to the  notions  of individual  rights  and group  rights
a third  notion:  democracy,  or the  regime  of democracy.
The  maximum  form  of exercising  your  group  rights  is  collec-
tive  exit or separation,  excision.  But there  are  no guarantees  that
this  new  subdivision,  let  it  be  a  state,  will  not  be  a  totalitarian
regime,  or  a  new  form  of suppression.  For  example,  subdivisions
in  Russia  today  want  to  separate  themselves  from  the  democratic
government  of Russia  and  introduce  the  classical  communist  gov-
ernment  as  it  existed  in  1945.  And  now  the  world  community
must decide  how  to weigh  these  possibilities,  because  it is  not rare
that the acceptance  of a group  right, or the maximum  group  right
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to  secede,  or  to  create  a  state,  may  directly  violate  the  individual
human  rights,  such  as  freedom of speech,  because  the group  right
and the  political  structure of the  group  may be  nondemocratic.
Professor Steiner: I  agree very  much  with  what you  said.  I  think  it is
absolutely  the  dilemma.  I  don't  know  enough  about  the  Soviet
Union  to make  the  kinds of judgments  that you make,  but I  have
met  numbers  of  people  from  the  southern  republics,  and  the
South's determination  to  secede  is  very  real.  One  of the  questions
posed  is  what  will  a  break-up  there,  or  in  Yugoslavia,  or  between
Slovakia and  Bohemia, or elsewhere,  mean  for the individual?
The  question  must focus on the welfare  of the individual. And
if you  are  going  to  find  a  former  Soviet  Union  in  which  each
group is  hostile behind  barbed  wire,  keeping  every  other language
and religion  out, it is  not  going  to  be  an  advance  in  civilization.
In  some  respects,  it  may  be  an  advance  on  what  was  an  extreme
of authoritarian  control  from  the  center.  So  those  are  exactly  the
contradictions  and  the  uncertainties  I have  in  mind.  It is  so  hard
to  make  gross  abstract  judgments  about  what  is  right  in  these
different  situations  the  way  we  can  say,  "You  have  a  right  not  to
be  tortured."
Professor Le. We  have  time  for one  last question.
Participant: We  have  so  far  talked  about  the  problem  as  if  there
were  a  tension  between  staying  behind  the  barbed  wire  and going
across  the  barbed  wire.  I  certainly grant  you  that, but in  addition,
as it  is very  often  with  tensions  in  dialectics,  does  not  the  one,  in
fact,  almost  further  the  other?  I  think  many  of these  determina-
tion  demands  are  made  because  there  is not  participation  because
of the  80/20  percent. The  minority,  in  fact, withdraws  in  order to
participate  at  times.  I  have  often  thought  that  maybe  we  need  a
new  concept,  which  we  might  call  "deferred statehood,"  meaning
that the  minority holds off the  possibility  of separating  entirely,  or
is willing  to  defer  separation,  so that  it has  that space,  and then it
explores  from  that  separate  position  the  possibility  of  continuing
linkage.  And,  in  fact,  I  think  that  some  of the  inter-ethnic  rela-
tions  in  Southeast  Asia  preliminary  to  the  colonial  period  have
features  of this  concurrent  connection  and  distance,  and  I  would
like  to  ask whether  we could  borrow  some  of that.
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Professor Steiner  It may be  that some  modern  version  of a humane
conception  of the older empires  would  be a suitable  alternative  to
the  modern  exclusive  state  as  a way  of thinking  of achieving  this
kind of diversity.  It  may be  the  way Western  Europe  is  going, un-
like  Eastern  Europe.  I  certainly  don't  think  we  should  view  the
present state  as  an  absolute  given  which  must  forever  continue  in
its  present form  as  the basic  unit of an  international  system.
These  have  been  useful  and  good  questions  for  me  to  think
about. You  probably  know  more  about  colonialism  than  I  do. But
it seems  to  me from what  I  do know that there  are  two contradic-
tory strands:  one  is,  the  rape of native  cultures, at every  level from
pop  culture  to  traditional  land  holding  and  status.  At  another
level,  it  was  not  in  the  interest  of  the  colonials  to  rule  every
square inch  of turf, and there  was  a lot of diversity  left among the
many  principalities  in,  say,  India:  the  Muslim  communities and the
Hindu  communities,  the  North  and  the South.
In  many  post-colonial  states,  the  oppressive  power  of the  cen-
ter,  all  the  way  from  tax  power  to  the  infusion  of  a  particular
form  of  culture,  often  a. Western-derived,  modernizing  kind  of
culture,  is  far  more  powerful  than  what  was  present  under  colo-
nials  who  were  content  to  extract  their  riches,  keep  the  locals  in
order,  suppress  rebellion,  and  otherwise  let local  life  go  on,  and
when  necessary  divide  and  conquer  by  setting  one  group  against
another.
So  there  is  this  two-edge  way  of thinking about  the  post-colo-
nial,  self-determining  state  and  its  effects  on  tribal  structures,  or
different ethnic  communities.
What was the  thrust of your  second  question?
Participant (repeated):  Whether  we  should  recognize  the  tension
or,  in  fact, see  the  mutual  aspects  of these  two  forms;  separating
in order  to  participate.
Professor  Steiner.  Yes,  and  maybe  we'll  have  to  experiment  with
lots  of  forms  that  way.  Recall  the  attempt  to  create  the  City  of
Mandela  a while  back, which  was  an  attempt  by a group  of blacks
living  in  the Boston  area,  in  a  place  called  Roxbury,  to form  their
own  self-governing  community.
If you  really  do  feel  blocked  out  of a  large  political  process,
and you  have  no  access  to  City Hall,  different forms of community
organization  and  devolution  of  power  to  community  groups  may
be  an  alternative  that  I would  encourage.
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On the other hand,  I'm saying  that under the  American  Con-
stitution, hence  under constraints  that  are  ethnically  or religiously
defined.  This  may  raise  thorny  problems  under  our  Constitution.
Nonetheless,  I'm  all  for  experimenting  in  a  lot of  different  ways
that would  be  ongoing  ways  of  living  together  or  learning  from
each  other.